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By Anne Uteck †
One of the most common uses of surveillance is in
the area of evidence gathering for investigation by litigators. Private investigators have long been retained for
this purpose, and law enforcement officers routinely
utilize surveillance devices to assist in the prosecution of
a crime. The admissibility of video surveillance evidence
obtained by private and government investigators is
obviously not a new issue. 1 What has come to the forefront is the application of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 2 in the context of
video surveillance evidence, and its impact on civil litigators. Privacy interests inherent in the collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information may be protected
under PIPEDA, which clearly adds another consideration
to the issue of admissibility of surveillance evidence. The
impact of PIPEDA on video surveillance evidence in the
employment context has been addressed by the federal
Privacy Commissioner, who has assessed the legitimacy
of surveillance on a ‘‘reasonableness’’ standard. 3 The
Ontario Superior Court, in Ferenczy v. MCI Medical
Clinics, 4 has now interpreted PIPEDA in the litigation
context in which a private investigator was used to
gather information by video surveillance. While much of
Dawson J.’s decision is obiter, his analysis with respect to
video surveillance and PIPEDA may be an indication of
how courts will deal with investigative evidence collected in the litigation process. The end result in Ferenczy is likely correct, but Dawson J.’s PIPEDA analysis
appears to be a fairly transparent effort to avoid transforming litigation ‘‘into something very different than it
is today’’. 5 While the insurance industry may have
breathed a sigh of relief, for privacy advocates, this decision is likely a cause for concern.
The plaintiff in Ferenczy commenced an action
against her doctor for medical malpractice in the treatment of removing a cyst from her wrist. At trial, she
testified that it was difficult to grasp a cup with her
injured left hand. At that point in the cross-examination,
defense counsel sought to admit video surveillance evidence taken by a private investigator hired by the defendant showing the plaintiff holding a Tim Horton’s coffee
cup for a period of time in her left hand. The Court
ruled that the surveillance tape could be admitted in the
cross-examination of the plaintiff to impugn credibility.

It was relevant evidence and the probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. 6
The plaintiff’s counsel objected to the use of the
surveillance evidence on the basis that it was personal
information collected in the course of commercial
activity without the plaintiff’s consent, in contravention
of PIPEDA. Dawson J. ruled that even if personal information was collected by video surveillance without the
plaintiff’s consent, there is no provision under PIPEDA
that prohibits its admissibility. 7 Rather, PIPEDA provides
a process for complaints to be made to the federal Privacy Commissioner, but the Court indicated that it ‘‘has
no direct impact on the admissibility of evidence in this
trial’’. 8 While this was enough to settle the admissibility
question in this case, Dawson J. went on to consider the
application of PIPEDA in the context of video surveillance, making three notable findings. First, he found that
the making of the videotape was not a commercial
activity because the private investigator was an agent of
the doctor who was collecting information to defend
himself against the lawsuit. This was, in Dawson J.’s view,
a ‘‘personal purpose’’, and therefore, outside the application of PIPEDA. Second, even if PIPEDA did apply, by
commencing the action, the plaintiff had given implied
consent to the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
information insofar as it related to the lawsuit. And
finally, even if there was no implied consent on the part
of the plaintiff, the exception provisions under PIPEDA
applied, which permitted the defendant’s collection, use,
and disclosure of personal information without consent.

Commercial Activity and Agency

T

he video surveillance was conducted by a licensed
private investigator hired by the Canadian Medical
Protective Agency (CMPA), which, inter alia, provides
legal assistance to physicians who are sued for medical
malpractice. The plaintiff argued that the private investigator paid by the CMPA was collecting and making a
record of the plaintiff’s personal information in the
course of commercial activity without her consent.
Dawson J. disagreed, finding that the correct interpretation of PIPEDA is to view the investigator as an agent of
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the doctor who was collecting, using, and disclosing the
information for the doctor’s ‘‘personal use to defend
against allegations brought by the plaintiff’’. 9 Thus,
PIPEDA did not apply because the information was
being collected for ‘‘personal or domestic purposes’’ 10
and not in the course of commercial activity.
This interpretation seems a considerable stretch of
the ‘‘ personal purpose ’’ exception under paragraph 4(2)(b). The defendant had, at least, a professional
interest in gathering information in defending the lawsuit. The term ‘‘commercial activity’’ is defined very
broadly under PIPEDA as including every transaction,
act, or conduct that is of a commercial character,
whether it is a single transaction or occurs in the regular
course of business conduct. 11 This arguably captures the
CMPA, on behalf of the defendant doctor, retaining a
commercial investigator to collect personal information
about the plaintiff. Dawson J. found the way to avoid this
conclusion, or an unfair result, was to characterize the
doctor’s interest in collecting the information as personal, thus setting up the agency theory.
Given the lengths to which Dawson J. appears to go
to take this litigation outside the application of PIPEDA,
the question arises as to what effect the new PIPEDA
Regulations, presumably not available prior to the rendering of this decision, would have made on Dawson J.’s
analysis. The result in Ferenczy is not inconsistent with
the amended PIPEDA Regulations dealing with investigative bodies. 12 Paragraphs 7(3)(d ) and (h.2) permit the
disclosure of personal information to and by an investigative body without the knowledge and consent of the
individual if the investigative body is specified by the
Regulations. The new Regulations amend the definition
of ‘‘investigative bodies’’ to include licensed private investigators or detectives. 13 It is made clear that the disclosure of personal information to and by private investigators without knowledge and consent is permitted. The
issue in Ferenczy was whether the information could be
collected in the first place, and in any event, Dawson J.
found the defendant’s collection and disclosure of the
plaintiff’s personal information by the private investigator to be for personal purposes. On the other hand, the
amended privacy regulations seem to remove any doubt
that private investigators are subject to PIPEDA. The regulations merely add them to the named ‘‘investigative
bodies’’ that can disclose personal information without
knowledge and consent. Presumably this was done to
ensure the investigative body would be able to disclose
the results of its investigation (the collection of information) to its client or other interested parties without consent. The amendment suggests that PIPEDA was
intended to apply to private investigators retained to
conduct surveillance for the purpose of verifying the
legitimacy of a personal injury claim. Courts may not,
therefore, find it necessary to resort to the application of
the Ferenczy agency theory to private investigators in the
litigation context where PIPEDA is raised. It will, however, be interesting to see how courts deal with this issue,
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as inevitably, PIPEDA will be argued by plaintiffs seeking
to exclude video surveillance evidence.

Implied Consent

D

awson J. concluded that even if PIPEDA did apply,
by starting the action, the plaintiff had given
implied consent to the collection and use of the personal
information insofar as it related to defending the lawsuit,
particularly in the circumstances where the recording
was done in a public place. In his view, the plaintiff must
have known that she was putting her injury and its
effects on her life into issue. Having started this action, it
could not be said, according to Dawson J., that the plaintiff did not consent to the gathering of information
about the nature and extent of her injury. 14
Under PIPEDA, personal information can only be
collected, used, and disclosed with the knowledge and
consent of the individual. 15 The Act contemplates that
implied consent may be appropriate in certain circumstances. 16 Dawson J. may, implicitly, be making a reasonableness assessment. However, without any express reference or consideration of ‘‘reasonableness’’, 17 Ferenczy
casts a broad net for capturing personal information,
allowing defendants to rely on implied consent to collect
and disclose personal information in any number of disputes being litigated. The impact of PIPEDA may call for
a more nuanced discussion of when and to what extent
some kinds of personal information can be collected for
the purposes of civil litigation.
Notwithstanding its far-reaching implications, even
if one accepts that starting a civil action implies consent
to gather personal information for the purposes of verifying a claim, how broadly can a plaintiff expect information about his or her injury and its effects on his or her
life be to collected and disclosed? The collection of personal information is still subject to the reasonableness
standard provided in PIPEDA. 18 Dawson J. assumes the
collection of the information was reasonable, but does
not articulate criteria upon which this assessment is
made.
Prior to the enactment of PIPEDA, courts generally
found plaintiffs to have, at best, a reduced expectation of
privacy in public places, allowing defendants to use private investigators to conduct video surveillance of a
plaintiff, provided there was a legitimate purpose for the
surveillance, such as gathering information relevant to a
lawsuit, and where the observation was not so constant
and obtrusive as to go beyond reasonable bounds. 19 In
the employment context, video surveillance evidence has
been admitted if the employer satisfied the threepronged test established in arbitral jurisprudence. 20
Where employers undertake investigative video surveillance of employees outside the workplace, the employer
must demonstrate that initiating the surveillance was
reasonable in all the circumstances, that it was conducted in a reasonable manner, and that there were no
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other alternatives available to the employer to obtain the
evidence sought. PIPEDA is consistent with these
approaches by mandating that a reasonableness standard
be applied to information-gathering by surveillance. This
creates an important limitation on those collecting personal information. Surveillance activities that a reasonable person would not consider appropriate cannot be
justified.
Ferenczy falls short here by assuming that implied
consent in the litigation context justifies the collection of
personal information by video surveillance in public
places, without taking into account the reasonableness of
the surveillance. In the end, the result would probably
not have been different, given the circumstances of location and purpose of the surveillance and the likelihood
of meeting the reasonableness test as required under
subsection 5(3) of PIPEDA. However, the decision leaves
open the extent and nature of information-gathering a
plaintiff is actually consenting to. The question remains
as to whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Ferenczy leads to the conclusion that there is no
expectation of privacy in public places once an action is
commenced. Surely, PIPEDA is of some consequence in
the litigation process where there is a need to balance
the rights of the defendant to gather the facts and verify
the legitimacy of the claim with the privacy rights of the
plaintiff.

Exemption from Consent
Requirement

T

he most interesting finding by Justice Dawson is
that even if his previous conclusions are incorrect,
the exception to the consent principle in section 7 of
PIPEDA applies. Specifically, paragraph 7(1)(b) provides
that personal information can be collected without consent if ‘‘it is reasonable to expect that the collection with
the knowledge or consent of the individual would compromise the availability or the accuracy of the information and the collection is reasonable for [the] purpose
related to investigating a breach of an agreement or a
contravention of the laws of Canada or a province’’. 21
Justice Dawson held that ‘‘the laws of Canada or a province’’ includes the common law, including the law of
tort, and that the video surveillance ‘‘related to investigation’’ of a tort claim. 22 Further, conducting the video
surveillance with the plaintiff’s knowledge or consent
would ‘‘compromise the availability or accuracy of the
information’’. 23 Therefore, in Justice’s Dawson’s view,
since paragraph 7(1)(b) applied, the plaintiff’s personal
information could be collected without her consent and
used without her consent, pursuant to paragraph 7(2)(d ). 24
Arguably, most cases where it is necessary to verify
the legitimacy of a personal injury, particularly those
made by persons suspected of fraudulent claims, would
justify information-gathering by video surveillance and
be captured by the first of the three-prong requirements
under paragraph 7(1)(b). The second requirement under
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paragraph 7(1)(b) is that the collection must be reasonable, mirroring the subsection 5(3) reasonableness standard. The absence of any discussion on the reasonableness of the surveillance weakens the overall analysis of
the impact of PIPEDA in relation to video surveillance in
the litigation context because an effective balance
between the plaintiff’s privacy interests and the defendant’s interests in defending himself or herself has not
been achieved. The third requirement under paragraph 7(1)(b) was given a wide interpretation by Dawson
J. so as not to limit the exception to contractual breaches
or fraudulent acts that violate federal or provincial laws.
The broad reading appears to contemplate that personal
information can be collected and disclosed during any
litigation process and that the paragraph 7(1)(b) exception extends to non-agreement situations.
An Ontario arbitration decision has considered the
application of PIPEDA in relation to video surveillance
evidence, ruling that the surveillance evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of paragraph 7(1)(b). 25 In Ross, the employee was terminated for
misrepresenting his health status. The employee had suffered a back injury while at work. He was off work and
then placed on administrative duties to accommodate
his injury. After several months, he continued to claim
he was unable to resume his duties as a truck driver.
Informing his supervisor that he would be moving
during his upcoming vacation, the employer hired a private investigator to conduct video surveillance of the
employee who was filmed moving furniture. The arbitrator found the consent exception in paragraph 7(1)(b)
was inapplicable, ruling that there were no reasonable
grounds for the investigation:
There were any number of other means that were available
to the employer to test the true extent of Ross’ restrictions
and the bona fides of his recovery . . . This is a case, where
the employer, without any evidence that the employee was
malingering or had made misrepresentations or spread disinformation as to his physical abilities, orders surreptitious
video surveillance in the hope of trapping the unsuspecting
employee during the course of moving furniture at his place
of residence at a time and place that he had voluntarily
disclosed to his employer. 26

In the arbitrator’s view, the employer’s interests do
not justify random video surveillance to see what it can
catch. Rather, surveillance is an extraordinary step that
can only be resorted to where there is reasonable and
probable cause to justify it. 27 The employer ‘‘attempted
to cast an electronic web to see whether it could catch
the employee while moving his family’’. 28 The gathering
of personal information by video surveillance was ‘‘not
reasonable for any purpose related to the investigation of
a breach of the employment agreement’’. 29 Thus, its collection without the knowledge or consent of the
employee was contrary to PIPEDA. Although the
employer could rely on paragraph 7(1)(b) insofar as it
related to an investigation of a ‘‘breach of an agreement’’,
the admissibility question ultimately failed by not
meeting the reasonableness standard imposed under the
Act. The decision is somewhat surprising, given that the
employer had what appeared to be legitimate reasons to
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suspect the employee was committing fraud. However,
Ross indicates that organizations wishing to rely on paragraph 7(1)(b) of PIPEDA must have a reasonable basis for
undertaking surveillance.
Even if courts follow Ferenczy’s broad reading of
paragraph 7(1)(b), at least some consideration has to be
given to the reasonableness qualifier. Ross and the federal Privacy Commissioner’s findings 30 may provide
some guidance as to how reasonableness will be interpreted in the context of video surveillance and PIPEDA,
although the extent to which this type of analysis will be
applied in the civil litigation process is uncertain. Had
Dawson J. considered the reasonableness qualifier in his
analysis, and assuming there was a reasonable basis for
conducting the surveillance of this plaintiff, the result
would likely be the same. However, subject to the circumstances leading to the surveillance activity, another
court could reach a different conclusion when assessing
whether the collection of personal information by video
surveillance was reasonable. For example, if only reasonable surveillance measures may be used, intrusive surveillance activity may constitute a violation of PIPEDA
where the information was capable of being gathered by
other means.
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In the end, Ferenczy is notable not so much for
what was said, but the implications of what was not
discussed in any depth, namely the reasonable expectation of privacy and the reasonableness of the surveillance. Not surprisingly, Justice Dawson concludes by
stating that PIPEDA ‘‘leaves a lot to be desired in terms of
clarity and usefulness’’, and in particular, with regard to
the conduct of litigation. 31 His analysis and interpretation of the Act says as much. Ferenczy likely reaches the
correct result, but marginalizes the impact of PIPEDA.
It can be expected that plaintiffs will continue to
challenge the admissibility of video surveillance evidence
by raising PIPEDA for reasons related to genuine privacy
concerns. Fraudulent personal injury claims will also
continue. For the reasons stated, Ferenczy does not
resolve the issue of investigative evidence and the impact
of PIPEDA in the litigation context. It is, however, the
first case to provide assistance to civil litigators on how
courts will interpret PIPEDA, and as such, cannot be
ignored.
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